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I. INTRODUCTION
In the middle of Herman Cain's campaign for the 2012 U.S.
Republican Party presidential nomination, multiple women who were
once Cain's coworkers came forward with allegations of sexual
harassment. Cain immediately deemed the allegations "totally
baseless and totally false."' However, after continued questioning
about whether his previous actions were inappropriate, Cain
responded, "In my opinion no, but as you would imagine, it's in the eye
of the person who thinks that maybe I crossed the line."2
Unfortunately, Cain's vague and evasive response is evocative of
current sexual harassment law, which generally lacks clarity and is
often dependent on individual perceptions.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") did
not recognize sexual harassment in the workplace as a violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 until 1980, and the Supreme
Court did not define sexual harassment until Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson in 1986.3 In Meritor, the Court defined actionable sexual
harassment as harassment that "must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment.' "4 Today, the Court
recognizes two forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile
work environment.5 Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a
supervisor demands sexual favors from an employee in return for
advancement or continued employment in the workplace.6 Hostile
work environment harassment occurs when workplace harassment is
so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of employment.7
This latter form of harassment is incredibly difficult for most courts to
define, as they must determine what actions meet the vague standard
1. Debra Cassens Weiss, Is Herman Cain Creating New Legal Headaches by Denying
Harassment?, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/is_herman_cain_
creating-new_1egal-headaches.by-denying-harassment.
2. Id.
3. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986); EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES ON VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY
SUPERVISORS (2010) [hereinafter EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES], available at http://www
.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html.
4. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
5. Id. at 65.
6. See id. (contrasting quid pro quo with hostile work environment); EEOC,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 3 (describing quid pro quo harassment as a situation in
which an employee "rejects the demands and is subjected to an adverse tangible employment
action or submits to the demands and consequently obtains a tangible job benefit').
7. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 3.
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of "severe or pervasive."8 The task is especially difficult because
individuals have different perceptions of what behaviors are severe
enough to constitute harassment.
In order to clarify the definition of hostile work environment
harassment, legal scholars and judges have developed many standards
to assist courts in determining what is severe or pervasive. Certain
studies suggest that what is severe or pervasive should be determined
by a reasonable woman standard, instead of a reasonable person
standard, because women have different perceptions of and reactions
to sexual harassment.9 To date, only the Ninth and Third Circuits
have adopted this theory, and the Supreme Court has not resolved
this circuit split.10 A more recent theory suggests that courts should
consider the source of the harassment when determining severity
because supervisor harassment is generally perceived to be more
severe than coworker harassment." One scholar has also suggested
that, because the purpose of including sex as a protected class in Title
VII is to diminish sex discrimination, plaintiffs who work in
businesses that have integrated both sexes equally in the workplace
should have a higher burden of proof than plaintiffs who work in sex-
segregated businesses when they sue that business or their coworkers
and supervisors of that business for sexual harassment. 12 This Note
uses empirical evidence to argue that these three theories-the
reasonable woman standard, the acknowledgment that individuals
view supervisor harassment as more severe, and the importance of
workplace integration-should indeed be integrated into sexual
harassment law. This Note argues that these legal considerations
would improve the incentives employers face under Title VII.
In 1980, 1987, and 1994, the U.S. Merit Systems Protection
Board ("MSPB") issued a survey to a broad selection of federal
employees to solicit information on sexual harassment in the
workplace.' 3 To date, scholars have only used summary statistics from
8. This difficulty was recognized in the different context of employer liability in Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785 (1998) ("Since our decision in Meritor, Courts of Appeals
have struggled to derive manageable standards to govern employer liability for hostile
environment harassment perpetrated by supervisory employees.").
9. See infra Part III (providing a description of legal scholars' support and criticism of the
reasonable woman standard).
10. See infra Part III (discussing the approaches of the various federal appellate courts as
to the reasonable woman standard).
11. Susan Grover & Kimberly Piro, Consider the Source: When the Harasser Is the Boss, 79
FORDHAM L REV. 499, 500 (2010).
12. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2174-83 (2003).
13. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE:
TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 1 (1995) [hereinafter FEDERAL WORKPLACE].
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this study to support the reasonable woman standard. This Note
builds on those studies by empirically analyzing the 1994 MSPB
survey to empirically support all three above-described theories. Part
II of this Note describes the MSPB survey and corresponding dataset.
Part III provides background information on the reasonable woman
standard by looking at the circuit split, social science literature, and
legal literature. Part III also supports the reasonable woman standard
by providing empirical results that show women are much more likely
than men to believe that certain behaviors constitute sexual
harassment. Part IV assesses the theory set forth by Susan Grover
and Kimberly Piro that courts should consider supervisor status of the
harasser when determining whether behavior is actionable as hostile
work environment harassment.14 Part IV also supports the theory by
providing empirical results that show employees are more likely to
believe a certain action represents harassment when the harasser is a
supervisor. Part V discusses the proposal advanced by Vicki Shultz to
alter the hostile work environment standards based on the level of sex
integration in the particular workplace. Part V also supports
considering the level of sex integration in a workplace when
determining actionable sexual harassment by providing empirical
results that show women are more likely to experience harassment
when they are employed in a male-dominated workplace. Finally,
Part VI encourages courts to integrate these theories into hostile work
environment law, because without the incorporation of these theories,
courts may neither recognize nor deter certain actions that employees
perceive as harassment.
II. DATA: THE MSPB SURVEY
The MSPB is a quasi-judicial federal agency that Congress
established in 1979 to function as the guardian of federal
employment. 15 By statutory mandate, Congress required the MSPB to
conduct studies to evaluate the status of federal employees. 16 In 1978,
1987, and 1994, the MSPB conducted surveys to evaluate the
prevalence of sexual harassment and sexual harassment training in
federal workplaces.17 The MSPB mailed anonymous, voluntary
surveys to almost 13,200 employees, and over 61% returned the
14. Grover & Piro, supra note 11, at 500.
15. About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BOARD, http://www.mspb.gov/About/about
.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
16. See id. ("MSPB carries out its statutory responsibilities and authorities primarily by
adjudicating individual employee appeals and by conducting merit systems studies.").
17. FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 13, at 1.
358 [Vol. 66:1:355
SEVERE OR PERVASIVE
questionnaires.18 The resulting dataset contains responses from 4,259
females and 3,560 males. The respondents include: blue- and white-
collar employees; employees without a high school diploma, as well as
those with graduate degrees; supervisors, as well as trainees; and
employees from all age groups above the age of eighteen. 9
The 1994 survey-modeled after the previous surveys-solicits
the employee's perceptions of sexual harassment, the sexual
harassment training in place at the agency, her experience with
sexual harassment, and her opinions about sexuality in the
workplace. 20 The survey also asks for the employee's personal
demographics and the characteristics of her workplace. 21 In order to
measure perceptions, the survey asks the employee to report whether
she believes a certain action is sexual harassment if conducted by a
coworker or if conducted by a supervisor.22 The survey inquires about
several behaviors: unwanted letters or calls of a sexual nature,
touching or leaning over, sexually suggestive looks or gestures,
pressure for sexual favors, pressure for dates, and sexual teasing or
remarks. 23 Part III of this Note analyzes the responses to these
perception questions to show that men and women have different
perceptions of sexual harassment-a result that supports using the
reasonable woman standard.24 Part IV of this Note then analyzes
these responses to show that federal workers believe more behaviors
constitute harassment when the harasser is a supervisor. 25 Part V
18. Id. at 1, 2. This response rate is consistent with similar surveys that have been
empirically analyzed. For example, a 1995 Department of Defense sexual harassment survey had
a response rate of 58%. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1995 SEXUAL
HARASSMENT STUDY, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/fact_sheets/sxhas95.html. The
MSPB provides a sample weight to adjust for the oversampling of females, certain pay grades,
and certain agencies. I include this sample weight in the regression analyses and when I
determine descriptive statistics. Including this weight lessens the concern of systematic bias
associated with certain employees not returning the survey.
19. Id. at 2.
20. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: 1978-
1980, 1987, AND 1994: 1994 DATA app. 1 (1997) [hereinafter 1994 DATA], available at
http://www.icpsr.umich.eduIicpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/06893. For simplicity, I only use female
pronouns to refer to the respondents; however, both men and women responded to the MSPB
survey and are included in this analysis.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See infra Part III.D (finding that women believe more actions constitute harassment
than men).
25. See infra Part IV.C (finding that respondents believed that more actions constituted
harassment when the harasser was a supervisor).
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analyzes the responses to show that the sex integration of the
workplace affects perceptions.26
The survey also asks if the employee has experienced any of
the above unwanted advances in the past two years.27 If the
respondent answers yes, the survey asks him or her to answer a series
of questions about the most prominent harassment experience that
occurred in the previous two years.2 8 The respondent reports her
personal and workplace demographics at the time of the sexual
harassment: age, marital status, education level, supervisor status,
pay level, occupation, share of men and women in her workplace, and
the agency employer. 29 A respondent who has not experienced
harassment provides these demographics based on her current
employment. 30 I control for these personal and workplace
demographics, in addition to others that may affect an employee's
perceptions of sexual harassment, in determining that women and
men have different perceptions of sexual harassment. I also control for
these demographics when determining whether the integration of the
workplace affects perceptions and occurrences of harassment. 31
Because the survey covers only federal employees, some may
argue that the conclusions of this Note are limited to that context.
However, as discussed above, the sample represents the 1.7 million
employees of the executive branch of the federal government, contains
representatives from a variety of demographics (age, marital status,
education, and economic status), and contains a fairly even number of
male and female respondents.32 Although the survey responses do not
26. See infra Part V.B (finding that male-dominated workplaces lead to more harassment
and affect some perceptions of harassment).
27. 1994 DATA, supra note 20, at app. 1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See infra Parts IIID, V.C (providing empirical analyses of the perception variables).
Table 1A of the Appendix provides summary statistics for each of these demographic and
perception variables.
32. FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 13, at 2. Some readers may be concerned that this
data oversamples certain federal employees, including those who were harassed. Fortunately,
the survey data include a weighting variable, which takes into account the likelihood that an
employee of a certain pay grade, sex, and agency will receive the survey and her probability of
returning the survey. This variable is included in each regression in order to make the results
representative of the federal government. Oversampling harassed individuals is always a
concern and cannot be tested for. However, only 48% of the female respondents report being
harassed and 24.5% of the males report being harassed. In addition, women are only 1.5 times
more likely than men to be in our sample, compared to the federal workforce, and it is believed
that women are at least 2.5 times more likely to be harassed in the workplace. In 1997, women
were almost ten times more likely to file a sexual harassment claim than men-men only filed
11.7% of the EEOC claims in 1997. Gary Langer, One in Four U.S. Women Reports Workplace
360 [Vol. 66:1:355
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indicate race, the federal government workforce is 57% male,33 16.7%
African American, 5.7% Hispanic, and 4.6% Asian, which is relatively
similar to the composition of the U.S. population as a whole-
currently 49.2% male, 12.9% African American, 4.8% Asian, and
16.3% Hispanic. 4 As a result, this sample is probably fairly
representative of the U.S. population.
III. THE VICTIM's GENDER MATTERS
A. Background
After the Supreme Court defined hostile work environment
sexual harassment in Meritor, a circuit split developed over whether
the severity or pervasiveness of alleged sexual harassment in the
workplace should be looked at from the perspective of a reasonable
person or a reasonable woman.35 In response, many scholars have
analyzed social science studies on female harassment perceptions, the
consequences of each standard, and the rulings that created the circuit
split.36 Although scholars have supported the reasonable woman
standard with summary statistics from sexual harassment surveys
(including the MSPB surveys), this Note advances the argument by
offering a true empirical analysis of the 1994 MSPB data in Section D
of this Part. The empirical analysis shows that women are up to 13.8
percentage points more likely than men to believe that certain actions
constitute harassment, even when controlling for important individual
demographics and workplace characteristics that may influence
perceptions.37
Harassment, ABC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011), httpJ/abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/11/one-in-
four-u-s-women-reports-workplace-harassment; Sexual Harassment Charges: EEOC & FEPAs
Combined FY 1997 - FY 2011, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http//www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ sexual harassment.cfm (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
33. FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 13, at 2.
34. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EXECUTIVE BRANCH (NON-POsTAL) EMPLOYMENT
BY GENDER, RACE/NATIONAL ORIGIN, DISABILITY STATUS, VETERANS STATUS, DISABLED
VETERANS 1994 - 2006, available at http://www.opm.gov/feddata/demograp/tablel-1.pdf; State
and County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, httpJ/quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000
.html (last revised Sept. 18, 2012).
35. Nicole Newman, The Reasonable Woman: Has She Made a Difference?, 27 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 529, 533 (2007).
36. Ann Juliana & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 548, 584 (2001).
37. See infra Part II.D (providing empirical-analysis results that support the reasonable
woman standard).
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B. Circuit Split
The development of the reasonable woman standard is often
credited to Judge Damon Keith's dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Company, a Sixth Circuit case holding that sexual posters in
the plaintiffs work environment did not create a hostile work
environment that would interfere with a reasonable person's
psychological well-being. 38 In his dissent, Judge Keith claimed that
harassment should be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable
woman, because there is a gap between men's and women's views of
appropriate sexual conduct. 39 Judge Keith stressed Title VII's goal of
preventing discrimination in the workplace and argued that
discrimination would continue if the court did not adopt a reasonable
woman standard. 40
In 1991, the Ninth Circuit explicitly adopted the reasonable
woman standard in Ellison v. Brady.41 The court reversed a summary
judgment ruling for the defendant, holding that unwelcome letters
and contact from the plaintiffs coworkers could constitute conduct
that a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter workplace conditions. 42 The court applied the
reasonable woman standard because women have different
experiences with harassment and different perceptions about what
constitutes harassment.43 The court stated, "We adopt the perspective
of a reasonable woman primarily because we believe that a sex-blind
reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women."44 The Third Circuit
followed the New Jersey Supreme Court45 and applied the reasonable
woman standard in Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department, holding
that the conduct's severity, pervasiveness, and impact on the working
38. 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986); Newman, supra note 35, at 535-36. Note that the
Supreme Court held that psychological damage was not a requirement of hostile work
environment harassment in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
39. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The New Jersey Supreme Court developed a four-prong standard to determine whether
the harassment is actionable. Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 603-04 (1993) (holding
that the plaintiff must establish that "the complained-of conduct (1) would not have occurred but
for the employee's gender; and it was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable
woman believe that (4) the conditions of employment are altered and the working environment is
hostile or abusive").
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environment must be viewed from the female perspective, because a
gender-specific standard allows for flexibility and "recognize[s] and
respect[s] the difference between male and female perspectives on
sexual harassment."46 The Third and Ninth Circuits are the only
circuits that explicitly apply a reasonable woman standard at this
time.
On the other hand, the Fifth, Eighth, and First Circuits
explicitly reject the reasonable woman standard.47 The Fifth Circuit
rejected the standard upon first considering it in DeAngelis v. El Paso
Municipal Police Officers Association, stating, "The test is an objective
one, not a standard of offense to a 'reasonable woman.' "48 In contrast,
the Eighth and First Circuits each originally applied the reasonable
woman standard in hostile work environment harassment cases, but
after the Supreme Court decided Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
discussed below, both circuits rejected the reasonable person
standard.49 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has applied the
reasonable person standard without commenting on the reasonable
woman standard,50 and the remaining circuits do not explicitly
address a reasonableness requirement.5'
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve this circuit split. In the
1993 case Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to address the lower court's discussion of the reasonable
woman standard. 52 The Court declined to clarify the vague severe-or-
pervasive standard, stating, "But we can say that whether an
environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking
46. 174 F.3d 95, 115 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 19
(1st Cir. 2002); Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1996).
47. Newman, supra note 35, at 552.
48. 51 F.3d. 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted).
49. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). The Eighth Circuit applied the
reasonable woman standard in Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962-65 (8th
Cir. 1993), but upheld a reasonable person standard after Harris in Gillming v. Simmons Indus.,
91 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1996), which is discussed below. See Cynthia A. Dill, The Reasonable
Woman's Standard in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 12 ME. B.J. 154, 156 (1997) (discussing a
stall in the reasonable woman standard after Harris). The First Circuit applied the reasonable
woman standard in Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988), but in post-Harris
cases cited Harris and applied a reasonable person standard. Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d
76, 92 (1st Cir. 2005); Marrero v. Goya of P.R, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 19 (1st Cir. 2002).
50. See Newman, supra note 35, at 552 n.162 (citing cases that explicitly apply a
reasonable person standard).
51. See id. at 552 n.161 (citing First, Fourth, Seventh, Second, and Tenth Circuit cases that
discuss hostile work environment harassment standards).
52. 510 U.S. at 20. Instead, the Supreme Court simply held that if the conduct could
reasonably be perceived to create a hostile or abusive environment, there is not an additional
requirement of psychological injury. Id
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at all the circumstances."53 The Court described these circumstances
as the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance."54 Even though the Court did not mention the
plaintiffs gender in its description of the circumstances, 55 some legal
scholars and courts have interpreted the totality-of-the-circumstances
standard as the Supreme Court justifying the application of the
reasonable woman standard.56 On the other hand, scholars and courts
who believe the reasonable woman standard is outside the boundaries
of Title VII often interpret the Supreme Court's mention of a
"reasonable person" as support for their rejection of the reasonable
woman standard.57
The Supreme Court most recently addressed sexual
harassment standards in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.5 8 In Oncale, the Court addressed the "all the circumstances"
standard developed in Harris and focused on the fact that severity
should be judged from the viewpoint of "the reasonable person in the
plaintiffs position."59 Though this case involved same-sex harassment,
proponents have interpreted the Court's focus on "all the
circumstances" and on "the plaintiffs position" as encouraging the use
of the reasonable woman standard.60 The Supreme Court also
recognized the importance of the "social context" and the
"constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships."61 Scholars have suggested that this language further
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 17, 21, 22.
56. See Leslie M. Kerns, A Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists Should Give the Reasonable
Woman Standard Another Chance, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 195, 206-08 (2001) (arguing for
the reasonable woman standard and discussing that the Supreme Court's mention of the
reasonable person in Harris only applies to what a plaintiff must present to have an actionable
claim); see also Susan Collins, Note, Harris v. Forklift Systems: A Modest Clarification of the
Inquiry in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1515, 1539-40
("However, the Harris Court's use of the reasonable person standard does not necessarily mean
that the victim's gender will always be irrelevant. In fact, the Court may have left the door open
to considerations of the victim's gender.').
57. See Leonard Niehoff & Andrea Roumell Dickson, Title VIl and the "Hostile Work
Environment", 73 MICH. B.J. 76, 77 (1994) ("Harris arguably settled the debate by adopting the
reasonable person standard to assess sexual harassment cases.").
58. 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
59. Id.
60. Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57 FLA. L. REV. 133,
175 (2005); Newman, supra note 35, at 539.
61. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82.
364 [Vol. 66: 1:355
SEVERE OR PERVASIVE
supports the reasonable woman standard, because the standard is also
context-specific and depends on circumstances and expectations. 62
Because the Supreme Court did not settle the circuit split in
Harris or Oncale, the Ninth and Third Circuits continue to apply the
reasonable woman standard; however, the Eighth and First Circuits,
which once adopted the reasonable woman standard, moved to the
reasonable person standard in post-Harris hostile work environment
harassment cases. 63 As a result, the circuit split continues, and the
question of whether to view the severe-or-pervasive standard from a
gender-specific perspective continues to add to the ambiguity of hostile
work environment sexual harassment law.
C. Scholarly Debate
1. Social Science Support
Legal scholars and social scientists also continue to debate the
applicability of the reasonable woman standard. Support for the
reasonable woman standard primarily stems from assumed systematic
differences in how men and women perceive sexual harassment. 64 As
the Ninth Circuit explained in Ellison, women are more likely to
experience sexual harassment, including sexual assault, making them
more likely to be concerned with sexual harassment and more likely to
believe certain conduct constitutes harassment.65 In addition,
proponents of the reasonable woman standard cite the large economic
and social disparities that exist between men and women in the
workplace as a factor that leads to different perceptions. 66
Social science literature has helped ascertain the disparity
between men's and women's views of sexual harassment. Elizabeth
Shoenfelt et al. summarize the social science literature in an article
that empirically analyzes the application of the reasonable woman
standard and argue that it cannot be accurately enforced because
62. Hill, supra note 60, at 175.
63. See supra text accompanying note 49 (demonstrating the circuit split regarding the
proper standard for these types of cases).
64. Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable Woman: 1oes It
Matter?, 10 AL U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 633, 648-49 (2002).
65. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Women who are victims of
mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is
merely a prelude to violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may
view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or the
underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive."); see also Kellie A. Kalbac, Through
the Eye of the Beholder: Sexual Harassment Under the Reasonable Person Standard, 3 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 160, 162-63 (1994) (discussing the reasonable woman application in Ellison).
66. Kerns, supra note 56, at 210.
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juries and judges are not capable of applying a gender-specific
perspective. 67 This synthesis of the literature includes studies finding
that women are more likely than men to view a given behavior as
sexual harassment. 68 One of the cited studies, by Mary Gowan and
Raymond Zimmermann, had 215 respondents analyze seventeen
sexual harassment cases and decide whether they thought the
plaintiff should prevail and whether she should be granted monetary
damages. 69 Though this study had mixed results, the general
conclusion was that women were more likely than men to find
ambiguous conduct more offensive. 70 Other studies have focused on
the general differences in sexual perceptions between men and
women. For instance, three studies conducted by Frank E. Saal et al.
found that men see "sexiness" in a woman's behavior when women see
"friendliness" in the same behavior.71 Still other studies found a
difference between what actions men and women believe constitute
sexual harassment. 72 In 2001, Maria Rotundo et al. conducted a meta-
analysis of sixty-two studies of gender differences in harassment
perceptions and found that women perceive more types of sexual
conduct as harassment than men do and that this difference was
greatest in hostile work environment situations.73 This Note adds to
this literature by actually isolating the female difference by including
workplace and personal demographic controls in the empirical
analysis and by analyzing a more representative and larger sample
than did the majority of these studies. 74
67. Shoenfelt et al., supra note 64, at 647-51.
68. Id. at 648 nn. 107-08.
69. Mary A Gowan & Raymond A. Zimmermann, Impact of Ethnicity, Gender, and
Previous Experience on Juror Judgments in Sexual Harassment Cases, 26 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL 596, 613 (1996); Shoenfelt et al., supra note 64, at 648-49.
70. Gowan & Zimmerman, supra note 69, at 613; Shoenfelt et al., supra note 64, at 648-49.
71. Frank E. Saal et al., Friendly or Sexy?: It May Depend on Whom You Ask, 13 PSYCHOL
WOMEN Q. 263, 274-75 (1989).
72. See Maria Rotundo et al., A Meta-Analysis Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions
of Sexual Harassment, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 914, 914 (2001) (analyzing and providing a
detailed account of social science studies on harassment perceptions).
73. Id.
74. The studies typically analyzed university students and employees. For an example of
one of the university studies, see generally Roger C. Katz et al., Effects of Gender and Situation
on the Perception of Sexual Harassment, 34 SEX ROLES 35 (1996). In Part III.D.1 of this Note, I
discuss Thacker and Gohmann's study-which analyzes the 1987 MSPB data and is included in
Rotundo et al.'s meta-analysis-and provide an explanation of how this Note advances that
study. See infra Part III.D.1.
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2. Legal Literature Split
Because some social scientists report a disparity between male
and female perceptions of sexual harassment, legal scholars who are
proponents of the reasonable woman standard argue that the
reasonable person standard is inherently biased.75 Arguing that a
gender-neutral standard ignores the gender differences that exist in
sexual harassment, proponents contend that only a gender-specific
standard can accurately compensate women for sexual harassment
and actually deter all actions that are perceived as sexual
harassment.76 In addition, proponents suggest that because the
reasonable person has traditionally "maintained a masculine
identity," this standard allows sex discrimination to continue in the
workplace.77 However, Leslie Kerns argues that everyone should
embrace the reasonable woman standard, because "[ilf women are
predominantly the victims and men are predominantly the aggressors,
how can feminists expect male judges to properly enforce the law that
prohibits sexual harassment unless the judges consider the alleged
conduct from the female victim's perspective?"78
Proponents of the reasonable woman standard also argue that
the purpose of Title VII is to achieve equal opportunities for women in
the workplace. 79 They argue that Congress did not establish Title VII
to simply maintain the status quo, but to eliminate sex discrimination
and the disparity that exists between men and women in the
workplace.80 Proponents of the reasonable woman standard hope that
a gender-specific standard will help the courts enforce Congress's goal.
They argue that a gender-specific standard can help reach this goal
because "heightened sensitivity will bridge the gender gap on
perceptions of harassing conduct." 81 These proponents hope that this
"heightened sensitivity" will alter the perceptions of men in the
workplace and more adequately deter sexual harassment, a significant
form of sex discrimination.82
According to critics, there are four main potential problems
with the reasonable woman standard: (1) it does not reflect the
interests of all women; (2) men cannot objectively apply a reasonable
75. Kerns, supra note 56, at 211.
76. Newman, supra note 35, at 542.
77. Kerns, supra note 56, at 210-11.
78. Id. at 209.
79. Newman, supra note 35, at 544-45.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 544.
82. Id.
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woman standard; (3) it makes women look weak and vulnerable in the
eyes of the law;83 and (4) a gender-specific standard is contrary to the
basic goals of Title VII because it reinforces stereotypes and will
create a slippery slope of defenses where parties argue for ethnicity-
specific, religion-specific, education- specific, or economic- specific
standards.84
Some feminist critics of a reasonable woman standard are
concerned that establishing a difference between a reasonable woman
and a reasonable man only encourages female stereotypes and
expands the male-female disparity in the workplace.85 Whereas
proponents for the reasonable woman standard argue that it helps
achieve the integrated workplace that Congress hoped Title VII would
create,86 opponents believe that a reasonable woman standard, by
encouraging stereotypes, can hinder Title VII's most basic goal of
preventing sex discrimination.8 7
Other opponents argue that the reasonable woman standard is
impractical because male judges and jurors cannot accurately adopt
the viewpoint of a reasonable woman.88 Further, even if they could
adopt that viewpoint, it would be subjectively based on particular
females in their lives.89 After all, if the male-female perspective on
harassment is different enough to justify different standards, then
how could one expect a man to be able to apply the female
perspective?90 Shoenfelt et al. conducted a study in order to test this
exact difficulty and found not only that males were less likely to
perceive certain advances as sexual harassment but also that "[t]he
particular standard under which an individual was asked to evaluate
the case did not have an impact on whether or not a change in
perceptions occurred."91
Other critics focus on the fact that women are not one
homogeneous group and that no two women have identical thoughts or
perceptions.92 They argue that women who do not fit into a "typical"
female profile-arguably white, upper-class, and heterosexual-may
83. Kerns, supra note 56, at 222.
84. Newman, supra note 35, at 548-50.
85. Kerns, supra note 56, at 223; Newman, supra note 35, at 547; Shoenfelt et al., supra
note 64, at 656-57.
86. Newman, supra note 35, at 544.
87. Id. at 549-50.
88. Kerns, supra note 56, at 223.
89. Id.
90. Newman, supra note 35, at 548-49.
91. Shoenfelt et al., supra note 64, at 659-67.
92. Newman, supra note 35, at 547.
[ Vol. 66: 1:355368
SEVERE OR PERVASIVE
be excluded from the reasonable woman standard.93 Opponents believe
that the adoption of the reasonable woman standard could lead to
arguments for gender- or race-specific standards in other Title VII
cases outside of sexual harassment because Title VII also prohibits
harassment on the basis of race, religion, and national origin.94
Opponents explain that this would unfairly burden employers and
perhaps make it even more difficult to meet the goals of Title VII by
establishing an unclear standard that would be difficult to enforce. 95
Ultimately, both the federal courts of appeals and legal scholars have
not resolved whether the reasonable woman standard is consistent
with the purpose of Title VII or whether its application will assist in
diminishing sexual harassment and sex discrimination.
D. The MSPB Survey Supports Adoption of the Reasonable Woman
Standard
1. The MSPB Literature
Although the MSPB last conducted the sexual harassment
survey in 1994, scholars continue to heavily cite the survey and
frequently analyze it because more recent sexual harassment data is
not readily available. 96 Social scientists and economists have analyzed
the survey in order to determine what characteristics of the
workplace, including sexual harassment training and sex integration,
are more likely to abate harassment. 97 Meredith A. Newman et al.
reported that females were statistically significantly more likely to
report being harassed than men, when controlling for many workplace
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Kalbac, supra note 65, at 167. Some scholars even suggest that victims could argue for
a reasonable person of the same gender and socioeconomic level. E.g., Saba Ashraf, The
Reasonableness of the Reasonable Woman' Standard: An Evaluation of the Use in Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 21 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 483, 498-99 (1992).
96. For an example of a similar study, see Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, The
Changing Nature of Employment-Related Sexual Harassment: Evidence from the U.S. Federal
Government, 1978-94, 57 INDUS. & IAB. REL. REV. 443 (2004).
97. See, e.g., Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, Does Sexual Harassment Training
Change Attitudes? A View from the Federal Level, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 826, 829 (2003) (finding that
sexual harassment training influences MSPB respondents' perceptions of harassment); Robert A
Jackson & Meredith A. Newman, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace Revisited:
Influences on Sexual Harassment by Gender, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 705, 711 (2004) (finding that
MSPB female respondents were more likely to experience harassment in male-dominated
workplaces).
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and personal demographic characteristics.98 Scholars have also
analyzed how sexual harassment perceptions have changed between
the 1987 and 1994 surveys, because during those years there was
growing attention to sexual harassment after the Supreme Court
defined it in Meritor.99 J. Mitchell Pickerill et al. studied this change
and also analyzed the effect that being female had on one's
perceptions of sexual harassment in 1987 and 1994.100 They found
that females were almost always more likely than men to believe
certain actions constituted sexual harassment. 101 However, this
analysis did not include controls for other important characteristics
and demographics, such as occupation, race, or pay grade.102
Scholars and the MSPB have also reported summary statistics
from the MSPB surveys. After completing the 1994 survey, the MSPB
compiled a report that included a discussion of the summary statistics
and how the agency would respond to the surprising results, which
indicated that 44% of female respondents and 17% of male
respondents had experienced unwelcome sexual attention in the
previous two years. 03 Shoenfelt et al. reported that 4% of the female
respondents reported that they experienced actual or attempted
sexual assault.104 Saba Ashraf reported summary statistics from the
1987 survey that show women believed more frequently than men that
certain behavior constituted sexual harassment; for instance, 64% of
women, compared to only 47% of men, believed unwelcome sexual
remarks constituted sexual harassment. 05 Thacker and Goman also
found support for the reasonable woman standard in the results of the
1987 MSPB survey, which showed that women's responses about their
perceptions were statistically different than men's.106 This Note not
only updates these studies with an analysis of the 1994 MSPB data
but also goes a step further by employing a multiple regression
98. Meredith A. Newman et al., Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace, 63 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 472, 475-76 (2003).
99. J. Mitchell Pickerill et al., Changing Perceptions of Sexual Harassment in the Federal
Workforce, 1987-94, 28 L. & POL'Y 368, 371-72 (2006).
100. Id. at 379.
101. Id. at 381 tbl.3.
102. Id.
103. FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 13, at vii. Note that the summary statistics reported
in this Note are slightly different because the means are weighted.
104. Shoenfelt et al., supra note 64, at 643.
105. Ashraf, supra note 95, at 488. Note that Ashraf still concludes that the reasonable
woman standard should be discontinued because of the consequences discussed above. Id. at 504.
106. Rebecca A. Thacker & Stephen F. Gohmann, Male/Female Differences in Perceptions
and Effects of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: 'Reasonable" Assumptions?, 22 PUB.
PERSONNELMGMT. 461, 465, 467 (1993).
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analysis in order to control for personal and workplace characteristics,
which allows the observer to isolate the effect of being female on
sexual harassment perceptions.
2. Theory and Empirical Specification
In order to add some clarity to hostile environment harassment
law, I use linear regressions to determine if being female significantly
affects the belief that certain behaviors constitute sexual harassment.
These linear regressions analyze the employee's responses to the 1994
MSPB sexual perception questions. As discussed in Part II, the survey
asked the respondent to report whether she believes a certain action
"definitely," "probably," "probably not," or "definitely does not"
constitute sexual harassment.107 The respondent could also respond
that she does not know if the conduct constitutes sexual
harassment.10 8 The survey prompted the respondent to report her
perceptions of the following conduct: uninvited letters, telephone calls
or materials of a sexual nature (Supervisor Calls and Coworker Calls);
uninvited and deliberate touching, leaning over, cornering, or pinching
(Supervisor Touch and Coworker Touch); uninvited sexually
suggestive looks or gestures (Supervisor Looks and Coworker Looks);
uninvited pressure for sexual favors (Supervisor Favors and Coworker
Favors); uninvited pressure for dates (Supervisor Dates and Coworker
Dates); and uninvited sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, or questions
(Supervisor Teasing and Coworker Teasing).109 In addition, the survey
asked the respondent to answer the question both as if the
harassment came from a supervisor and as if it came from a
coworker.1 0 An example of a perception-related survey question
follows:
1. Uninvited letters, telephone calls, or materials of a sexual nature.
a. If a supervisor did this, would you consider this sexual harassment?
b. If another worker did this, would you consider this sexual harassment?
Please mark one response for each question: definitely yes, probably yes, don't know,
probably not, definitely not."'
My empirical specification takes the following form:
(1) Pr (Perception=1) = D [Bo + 81'Female + 82'PC + B3'WC + e]
107. 1994 DATA, supra note 20, at app. 1.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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The dependent variable, Perception, is a dichotomous variable for
whether or not the respondent believes the behavior constitutes
harassment. The variable is equal to 1 if the respondent answered
"definitely yes" or "probably yes." If the respondent answered
"probably not" or "definitely not," the variable is equal to 0, meaning
the respondent did not believe the behavior constitutes actionable
harassment. I coded as missing those respondents who did not answer
the question or responded that they did not know what their
perceptions were, and missing respondents are not included in the
sample.112 PC is a vector of personal characteristics coded as indicator
variables; it includes marital status (Single, Married,
Divorced/Widowed), employment type (Management, Professional,
Clerical, Blue Collar, Trainee, Other Job), federal pay-grade level (Pay
Grades 1-4, 5-10, 11-12, 13-15, SES), education level (High School
Diploma or Less, Technical School, Some College, College Degree,
Some Grad School, Grad Degree), age (16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54,
Over 55), and supervisor status (Supervisor). WC is a vector of
workplace characteristics; it includes dichotomous variables for the
sex integration of the workplace (All Male Employees, More Male
Employees, Equal Male/Female, More Female Employees, All Female
Employees), the sex of the employee's supervisor (Male Supervisor,
Female Supervisor), and whether the agency is part of the Department
of Defense (DOD). Controlling for these demographics allows me to
isolate the effect on perceptions attributable to the differences
between men and women, after netting out the effects of respondents
having different levels of education, pay, or power. The independent
variable of interest is whether the respondent is female (Female).
I utilize a probability model using ordinary least squares
("OLS")113 regressions to estimate the effects.114 A positive and
significant coefficient on Female suggests that being female makes an
112. See infra Appendix Table 1A (providing summary statistics of each of these dependent
variables measuring perceptions).
113. OLS is a regression technique that provides estimates for the variable coefficients. The
resulting coefficients can be interpreted as marginal effects on the binary dependent variable-
whether or not the respondent believed a certain behavior constituted harassment.
114. Some may argue that a linear regression is not preferred for equations with a binary
dependent variable because it can predict impossible values, outside of the zero to one range, so
that the probit or logit regression would be preferred. ScoTT M. LYNCH, INTRODUCTION TO
APPLIED BAYESIAN STATISTICS AND ESTIMATION FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 193 (2007). However, I
utilize OLS because the model makes fewer assumptions and because certain variables in my
models perfectly predict outcomes, and probit or logit did not allow the inclusion of those
variables. I also ran probit regressions and got very similar results in each regression where the
probit model allowed for the inclusion of each variable, and these results are on file with the
author and the Vanderbilt Law Review. In addition, I report robust standard errors to address
heteroskedasticity.
372 [Vol. 66:1:355
SEVERE OR PERVASIVE
employee more likely to view the unwanted sexual behavior as
harassment. In addition, because the coefficients represent marginal
effects, the coefficient can be interpreted as a percentage-point change
in the probability that the respondent believed the behavior
constituted harassment due to the respondent being female.
A main criticism of the reasonable woman standard is that
women are not a homogeneous group and thus cannot be treated as
one.115 In order to reduce the heterogeneity that causes concerns
among critics of the gender-specific standard, my empirical
specifications control for as many personal demographics and
workplace characteristics as the survey allows.116 These demographics
include the respondent's marital status, employment type, pay-grade
level, education level, age, supervisor status, the sex of the
respondent's supervisor, the male-female integration of the
respondent's workplace, and the particular agency for which the
respondent works.117 These controls allow me to compare the
perceptions of a male to the perceptions of a female with the same
workplace and personal characteristics. As a result, the coefficient on
Female actually represents the effect that being female had on sexual
harassment perceptions for the respondents of the MSPB survey, not
the effect of different characteristics that might be correlated with
being female.
Previously, legal scholars have only compared the percentage of
men and women who believe a certain action constitutes harassment
in order to show differing perceptions.118 This Note advances this
literature because a positive and significant coefficient on Female,
when controlling for other characteristics that may affect perceptions,
provides stronger evidence of the difference between male and female
perceptions of what constitutes sexual harassment." 9 This result
would strengthen the argument that sexual harassment law must
account for these different perceptions and that the reasonable woman
standard is a simple and successful way to do that.
115. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing legal scholars' critiques of the reasonable woman
standard).
116. 1994 DATA, supra note 20, at app. 1.
117. See infra Appendix Table 1A (detailing summary statistics for each of these variables).
118. E.g., Thacker & Gohmann, supra note 106, at 467. I report these summary statistics in
Table 1A of the Appendix.
119. Though Pickerill et al. reports the effect that being female had on these responses in
1994, the study did not seem to control for personal demographics or workplace characteristics,
but only controlled for a female coefficient and interactions with the year. In addition, the study
focused on comparing the 1994 coefficient to the 1987 coefficient. Pickerill et al., supra note 99,
at 381 tbl.3.
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3. Results
Table 1 reports results for each of the regressions measuring
the effect of gender on perception. The column headings of Table 1
contain the dependent variable being analyzed in each regression.
Each column provides the coefficients on the independent variable of
interest, Female, for the corresponding regressions and the
coefficients' standard errors. Each column also provides the size of the
sample that the particular regression tested. 120 As discussed above,
the regressions also include each of the personal and workplace
variables in order to control for the heterogeneity of the sample and to
isolate the true difference between male and female perceptions.
The results clearly show that male and female perceptions of
sexual harassment are different. Each coefficient on Female is positive
and significant, 121 meaning that being female increases the likelihood
that a respondent will report that the sexual behavior at issue
constitutes harassment. The largest results are for Coworker Teasing
and Coworker Looks, and these results are significant at the 1% level,
meaning the probability of erroneously concluding that being female
has a statistically significant effect on one's view of sexual teasing and
looks or gestures from a coworker when in fact it does not is 1% or
less.122 A female employee is 13.8 percentage points more likely to
report that sexually suggestive looks from a coworker constitute
harassment and 12.9 percentage points more likely to believe sexual
jokes and teasing from a coworker constitute sexual harassment.
These behaviors are likely to be found in a hostile work environment
case, and courts often have difficulty determining whether the
behavior reached the level of severe or pervasive.123 The smallest
results are for specifications where the dependent variables are more
similar to quid pro quo harassment: pressure for sexual favors
(Supervisor Favors and Coworker Favors), unwanted touching
(Supervisor Touch and Coworker Touch), and unwanted pressure for
dates (Supervisor Dates and Coworker Dates). Men, women, and the
120. Note that the number of observations differs in each regression. If the sample size is
smaller, it is either because more respondents did not answer the question, or more respondents
answered that they did not know if the action constituted harassment, because both responses
are coded as missing.
121. Most are strongly significant, meaning they are significant at the 1% level
122. To be more specific, if the coefficient on female is 0.12, then being female increases the
respondent's probability of believing that the behavior constitutes harassment by twelve
percentage points.
123. See, e.g., Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 48-50 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing the
issues of fact when determining whether a male coworker staring at a female coworker's breasts
could constitute hostile work environment harassment).
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courts generally agree that these actions constitute sexual
harassment, so it is not surprising that being female has a smaller
effect on perception in these cases.124 In addition, the effect of being a
female is smaller when the dependent variable measures the
perception of behavior by a supervisor. The fact that supervisor
harassment is viewed as more severe than coworker harassment is
further discussed and analyzed in Part IV of this Note.
These results, especially for behaviors that resemble more
vague hostile work environment behaviors, strongly support the
reasonable woman standard. Females are as much as 13 percentage
points more likely to believe that some behavior constitutes
harassment. This difference is too substantial for courts to ignore. In
addition, the full regression results show that the other personal
demographic variables, which opponents of the reasonable woman
standard believe may also affect perceptions and lead to a slippery
slope of arguments for more standards, do not consistently affect
perceptions of harassment. Instead, Female is the only variable that
significantly affects each perception of harassment.125 These results
support the integration of the reasonable woman standard into sexual
harassment law. Women clearly have a different standard for what
actions constitute sexual harassment, and it does not consistently vary
by demographics or other characteristics; thus, if courts continue to
apply a gender-neutral standard, then they may not capture behaviors
that women believe to be sexual harassment-behaviors that could
interrupt their work performance. Because the threat of liability may
be necessary to properly encourage employers to prevent this type of
sex discrimination in their workplaces, the Supreme Court should
resolve the circuit split and adopt the reasonable woman standard.126
124. See, e.g., id at 48 ("Of course, behavior like fondling, come-ons, and lewd remarks is
often the stuff of hostile environment claims, including several previously upheld by this
Court.').
125. The full regression results are available on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review and
the author.
126. See infra Part VI (arguing for the adoption of the reasonable woman standard).
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Table 1
Coefficients on the Independent Variable Female for Each
Perception Regression
Dependent Variables
Sup CW Sup CW Sup CW
Favors Favors Dates Dates Touch Touch
Female 0.010** 0.011** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.028*** 0.041***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008)
Observations 6,438 6,219 4,864 5,832 6,338 6,159
Dependent Variables
Sup CW Sup CW Sup CW
Calls Calls Teasing Teasing Looks Looks
Female 0.055*** 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.129*** 0.098*** 0.138***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015)
Observations 6,234 5,989 5,776 5,569 5,920 5,710
Data Source: U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 1994 Sexual Harassment Survey.
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and the regression includes many
control variables and a constant term. **, *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. All values are weighted by the provided MSPB weight. See Appendix Table 1A for all
control variables and reference categories.
IV. THE SUPERVISOR STATUS OF THE HARASSER MATTERS
A. Background
The totality-of-the-circumstances test developed in Harris and
Oncale considers the relationships and social context surrounding the
harassment; courts and scholars often interpret these considerations
to include the power dynamic at a workplace.127 Susan Grover, a
professor of law at William and Mary Law School, and Kimberly Piro,
an attorney with the Department of Justice, suggest in their 2010
127. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998); Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993); see also Grover & Piro, supra note 11, at 507 (arguing that
the list of circumstances in Oncale was merely suggestive).
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article Consider the Source: When the Harasser is the Boss that courts
should take into account the source of harassment when considering
whether or not an action constitutes sexual harassment. 128 Because
social science studies have suggested that supervisor harassment is
perceived to be more severe and to have more detrimental effects than
harassment from a coworker, Grover and Piro suggest that if the
supervisor was the harasser, then courts should consider that fact
when determining whether the harassment was severe or pervasive.129
While this suggestion would add an additional component to hostile
work environment sexual harassment law, it would also promote
clarity and accuracy. My empirical analysis of the MSPB survey
confirms the social science studies that support this theory.8 0 My
results show that federal employees are significantly more likely to
believe that sexually suggestive actions constitute harassment if they
are performed by a supervisor than if they are performed by a
coworker.
B. Theory
Grover and Piro discuss the emergence of sexual harassment
law and the severe-or-pervasive standard.' 3' Key to this discussion is
the Supreme Court's focus on objectivity and the "all the
circumstances" standard in Harris.132 Grover and Piro believe that the
supervisor distinction should be part of the "circumstances" that the
court considers when determining severity in every case.133 Grover
and Piro criticize several lower courts that have treated the list of
circumstances described in Harris and Oncale as an all-inclusive list
of factors that contribute to the harassment determination, instead of
treating it as merely suggestive of a broader list.134 They argue that
treating the list as complete imposes an unfair test that the Court did
not intend to establish in Harris or Oncale.135
Instead, Grover and Piro believe that the Supreme Court
intended the severe-or-pervasive standard to be malleable and that
the Court showed that preference in Oncale.136 Grover and Piro argue
128. Grover & Piro, supra note 11, at 500.
129. Id. at 513-15, 518.
130. See infra Part IV.D (presenting empirical data supporting this assertion).
131. Grover & Piro, supra note 11, at 501-09.
132. Id. at 506.
133. Id. at 518.
134. Id. at 506.
135. Id. at 507.
136. Id.
2013] 377
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
that the Court's focus on the perspective of a person in the plaintiffs
position and the social context and relationships surrounding the
harassment gave rise to "a broad, context-sensitive approach" that
should always be used to determine if the conduct was severe or
pervasive enough to constitute actionable sexual harassment.137
Grover and Piro suggest that the Court should require the
status of the abuser-supervisor or coworker-to be analyzed as part
of the "broad, context-sensitive approach."138 This is not a drastic
proposal because the Supreme Court has noted the difference between
supervisor and coworker harassment in another context. 139 In
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, the Supreme Court developed standards for vicarious liability
in sexual harassment cases, and these standards differ depending on
whether the harasser was a supervisor or a coworker of the victim.14 0
If the harasser was a supervisor and the harassment resulted in a
tangible employment action, then the employer is automatically
vicariously liable for the harassment; however, if the harasser was a
coworker, then the employer is only liable if it did not take adequate
steps to prevent and correct the harassment and the victim followed
the procedures in place.141 Though this distinction was largely based
on agency law, Grover and Piro argue that it should also be recognized
when determining if the sexual harassment is severe or pervasive
enough to be legally actionable.142
In order to further support this theory, Grover and Piro provide
examples of lower court cases where the harasser was the
supervisor.143 They argue that if the courts had considered the status
of the harasser in the totality of the circumstances, then the courts
would have likely concluded that the harassment was severe or
137. Id. at 508.
138. Id.
139. See id. (noting that the supervisor/coworker distinction is relevant when determining
"whether employers should be liable for harassment once the harassment itself has been
proven"); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) ("On the one hand,
a supervisor's power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular
threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by the agency relation.");
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998) ("[A] supervisor might discriminate
racially in job assignments in order to placate the prejudice pervasive in the labor force.").
140. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802-03; see also Grover & Piro, supra
note 11, at 508, 508 nn.62-64 (describing the standards set forth in Ellerth and Faragher).
141. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Grover & Piro, supra note 11, at
508.
142. Grover & Piro, supra note 11, at 508, 518.
143. See id. at 509-11 (discussing a range of cases where courts were unable to find
actionable conduct despite instances of verbal and physical abuse by supervisors).
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pervasive enough to be actionable under Meritor.144 This different
result would occur because supervisor harassment is generally
understood to be more severe. 145 Many experts believe that the power
differential between the supervisor and the victim can elevate the
severity of the harassment.146 Grover and Piro cite the conclusions of
several sociology studies for support, including the observation that a
supervisor's power is based on her ability to determine the pay and
responsibilities of the employee and her ability to sanction the
employee if the employee does not submit.147 Another study showed
that victims of supervisor harassment opt for less assertive responses,
are more frequently forced out of their jobs, and experience worsening
feelings about work.148 Grover and Piro also cite a lower court case
where the court found that the "status of the harasser is a 'relevant
factor' in the 'all the circumstances' test" because "incidents of
harassment become proportionally more severe" when the harasser is
a supervisor.149 It is this consideration that Grover and Piro want
every court to adopt in hostile work environment cases.150
C. The MSPB Survey Supports Adoption of the Supervisor Distinction
1. Theory and Empirical Specification
My empirical analysis of the 1994 MSPB survey shows that
employees have very different perceptions about what constitutes
sexual harassment depending on whether it comes from a supervisor
or a coworker. Antecol and Cobb-Clark report summary statistics from
the MSPB survey in their study analyzing the impact of sexual
harassment training.151 Pickerill et al. also report this result in their
analysis of how perceptions changed between the 1987 and 1994
surveys.152 However, neither study discusses these results or provides
an analysis of the statistical difference between these perceptions.
144. Id. at 512-13.
145. Id. at 513-14.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 514 (citing Rebecca A. Thacker & Stephen F. Gohmann, Emotional and
Psychological Consequences of Sexual Harassment: A Descriptive Study, 130 J. PSYCHOL 429,
439 (1996)).
148. Id. (citing James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women's Responses to Sexual
Harassment: A Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC & APPUED Soc. PSYCHOL. 543 (1995)).
149. Id. at 514-15 (citing Steck v. Francis, 365 F. Supp. 2d 951, 972-73 (N.D. Iowa 2005)).
150. Id. at 518.
151. Antecol & Cobb-Clark, supra note 97, at 830-33.
152. Pickerill et al., supra note 99, at 376-79, 387.
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By simply comparing the percentage of respondents who
believe a certain behavior by a supervisor constitutes harassment to
the percentage who believe the same behavior by a coworker
constitutes harassment, it seems likely that the status of the harasser
makes a difference in an employee's perceptions of harassment.153 In
order to corroborate the importance of this supervisor distinction, I
conducted t-tests-a form of hypothesis testing that analyzes whether
the means of two variables are equivalent.15 4 The t-tests test for a
statistically significant difference between the percentage of
respondents who perceive supervisor behavior as harassment to the
percentage who perceive the same coworker behavior as harassment.
The t-tests I utilize are dependent (or paired) t-tests because the same
sample is answering each question. My hypothesis was that the
percentage of respondents who believe the unwanted behavior
constitutes harassment would be statistically significantly greater
when the behavior was performed by a supervisor. This hypothesis
stems from Grover and Piro's argument that employees generally
perceive supervisor behaviors as more detrimental and more often
think supervisor behaviors constitute harassment.
2. Results
Table 2 shows that, for each of the six behaviors, the
percentage of respondents who believe a behavior performed by a
supervisor is harassment is statistically different from the percentage
of respondents who believe the same behavior performed by a
coworker is harassment.155 As predicted, the difference between these
percentages is positive and significant at the 1% level in each
comparison. These results signify that respondents believe there is a
difference between actions performed by a coworker and a supervisor
and that unwanted sexual behavior is more likely to be viewed as
harassment when it is performed by a supervisor. The largest
differences are for behaviors that are more similar to hostile work
environment harassment, such as sexual teasing (Teasing), unwanted
calls and contact (Calls), and sexually suggestive looks and gestures
(Looks). These results support the theory that courts should take into
account the status of the harasser when determining whether
unwanted behaviors are severe or pervasive enough to constitute
actionable hostile work environment harassment. If courts do not
153. See infra Table 2 (providing the raw percentages and t-test results).
154. I utilize dependent sample t-tests (or paired sample t-tests in Stata) because the same
sample is answering both questions.
155. See infra Table 2 (illustrating the disparity).
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recognize that employees perceive supervisor harassment as more
severe, then current sexual harassment standards will not capture
unwelcome and severe supervisor harassment. Because the goal of
sexual harassment liability is to deter each of these behaviors that
interfere with an employee's workplace, courts should consider the
status of the harasser and adopt the supervisor distinction when
determining if certain behaviors constitute sexual harassment.
Table 2
Results of T-Tests Comparing Mean Perceptions of Supervisor
and Coworker Harassment
Variable Supervisor- Coworker
Difference
Favors 0.0015***
(n= 7,512) (0.0005)
Dates 0.0292***
(n=5,652) (0.0023)
Looks 0.0206***
(n=6,799) (0.00 18)
Calls 0.0259***
(n= 7,167) (0.0019)
Teasing 0.0364***
(n=6,5 58) (0.0024)
Touch 0.0117***
(n= 7,405) (0.0014)
Data Source: U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board Sexual Harassment Survey.
Notes: Means for the Difference between Supervisor and Coworker are reported, standard errors
are reported in parentheses, and *** indicates that the percentage of respondents who believe
the supervisor actions are harassment is statistically significantly greater (at the 1% level) than
the percentage who believe the coworker action is harassment. Note that the sample is not
stratified by sex in each analysis, and the values are not weighted due to programming
limitations. These results are for dependent sample t-tests (or paired sample t-tests in Stata).
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V. INTEGRATION OF SEXES IN THE WORKPLACE MATTERS
A. Brief Overview and Theory
In The Sanitized Workplace, Vicki Schultz discusses the many
difficulties-including vague standards-that plague sexual
harassment law and that have led employers to ban all forms of
sexuality from the workplace.156 Schultz suggests that courts could
help clarify sexual harassment law by considering the integration of
both sexes in the workplace when determining whether actions
constituted sexual harassment.15 7 Schultz's argument is that
employers who have successfully integrated both sexes into their
workplaces-by employing an equal number of men and women and
distributing them in equal positions-are more likely to have
successfully decreased sex discrimination, which is the goal of Title
VII.158 Shultz argues that these employers should be given the benefit
of the doubt when defending against sexual harassment.159 Thus,
plaintiffs suing those employers should face a higher burden when
proving that harassment did occur.1so Conversely, Shultz suggests
that plaintiffs working for employers who have not integrated their
workplaces should have a lower burden of proof.16 Though this theory
is controversial and there may be reasons to avoid its implementation,
my analysis of the 1994 MSPB survey results does show that sexual
harassment is more common in poorly integrated workplaces;
however, there is little empirical support for the argument that the
integration of sexes in the workplace influences perceptions of sexual
harassment.
Shultz provides a fairly detailed description of how current
sexual harassment laws should be altered to encourage integration.162
In hostile work environment cases against employers that maintain
"significantly segregated or unequal" workplaces, there would be a
rebuttable presumption that the harassment experienced by the
plaintiff was a direct result of her gender and constituted sex
156. Schultz, supra note 12, at 2063-72.
157. See id. at 2174-83 (offering a framework for evaluating sexual behavior from the range
of sex-segregated to well-integrated job settings).
158. See id. at 2174 ("[Flor purposes of evaluating whether complained-of sexual conduct is
likely to be part of a larger complex of sex discrimination. . . the most important variable is the
degree of sex segregation in the job and work setting.").
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2176.
161. Id. at 2175.
162. See id. (providing suggestions for the achievement of complete integration).
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discrimination under Title VII.163 In addition, there would be a
rebuttable presumption that the harassment was severe or pervasive
enough to be actionable under Meritor.'6 If the plaintiff is an
employee of an organization that maintained an integrated workplace,
it would become more difficult for the plaintiff to prove sexual
harassment. 165 Courts would enforce current sexual harassment
liability rules for employers that maintain a workplace that is in the
middle of these extremes.166
Shultz supports strengthening the harassment laws when the
workplace is male dominated because women are more frequently
harassed in those environments.' 6 7 She cites social science literature
that has shown that hostility and abuse are more frequent in sex-
segregated settings, often due to the power that men maintain.168 In
addition, Shultz argues that the degree of integration affects how
sexual conduct is perceived at work, suggesting that the same sexual
behavior is interpreted differently in a well-integrated workplace than
in a sex-segregated environment.169 Because women are likely in lower
positions in these environments and sexual harassment is likely a
more frequent problem, Schultz assumes that more forms of sexual
conduct are viewed as sexual harassment in sex-segregated as
compared to well-integrated workplaces. 170
163. Id. Note that Shultz also suggests that vertical sex integration, the integration of the
minority sex into equal authority positions, should be considered in quid pro quo sexual
harassment cases. Id at 2178. As with her hostile environment proposition, when the
environment is poorly vertically integrated, the plaintiff would have a lower standard of proof,
and in vertically integrated workplaces, the plaintiff would have a higher burden than in the
current system. Id. at 2178-79.
164. Id. at 2175.
165. The suggested changes include requiring proof that the actions "materially interfered
with the plaintiffs ability to perform or succeed in the job" and recognizing that subjective
perceptions of severity or pervasiveness would not be sufficient proof. Id. The suggestions also
included requiring the plaintiff to prove that the alleged harasser acted with the purpose to
discriminate because of the plaintiffs gender, which would prevent sexual content alone from
sufficing as proof. Id
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2139-40.
169. Id. at 2174.
170. Id.
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B. The MSPB Survey Supports Considering the Integration of the
Workplace
1. Theory and Empirical Specification
The MSPB survey asked respondents, "Are (were) the people
you work(ed) with during a normal work day: All men, more men than
women, about equal numbers of men and women, more women than
men, or all women?"171 Thus, the survey provides a way to analyze
whether the degree of integration in an employee's workplace affects
either the employee's perceptions of sexual harassment or the
employee's likelihood of being sexually harassed. Jackson and
Newman analyzed the 1994 MSPB survey and reported that the
degree of sex integration in the workplace does affect a federal
employee's likelihood of being sexually harassed. 172 Jackson and
Newman's results showed that when the ratio of male to female
employees decreases, a female employee's likelihood of being harassed
decreases.173 They also found that men have the greatest likelihood of
being sexually harassed in a female-dominated workplace and the
least likelihood in a male-dominated workplace. 174 This Part replicates
these results and analyzes them in light of Shultz's suggested liability
spectrum. In addition, I empirically analyze, for the first time,
whether integration has a similar effect on respondents' perceptions of
harassment.
Like the perception analyses performed in Part III, I utilized
OLS regressions175 to determine what effect the degree of sex
integration had on a respondent's likelihood of having been sexually
harassed. The empirical specification takes the following form:
(2) Pr (Harassment=1) = (D [Bo + B'Integration + B2PC + B3'WC+ ]
The dependent variable Harassment is a dichotomous variable
for whether the respondent reported that she was sexually harassed in
the previous two years. Integration is a vector of the independent
variables of interest; it represents the level of sex integration in the
workplace and the sex of the supervisor. The level of sex integration is
measured with dichotomous variables for each of the following: a
171. 1994 DATA, supra note 20, at app. 1.
172. Jackson & Newman, supra note 97, at 710-12.
173. See id. at 711 ("Moving from an environment in which all coworkers are male to one in
which all coworkers are female decreases her [a woman respondent's] probability of having been
harassed by 31 percentage points (50 percent).").
174. Id. at 711-12. Table 2 and Table 3 of the article provide coefficient estimates and
percentage interpretations. Id
175. See supra notes 113-14 (providing a discussion of the OLS model).
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workplace having all men (All Male), more men than women (More
Male), more women than men (More Female), or all women (All
Female). The omitted category is the dichotomous variable for equal
men and women (Equal Male/Female). This category acts as the
baseline against which each of the other workplace variables is
compared. The sample is separated into men and women in order to
see the effect of less integration on the minority sex; as a result, a
variable for whether or not the respondent is female is not included in
the regression. In order to control for the effect that socioeconomic
factors and other workplace and personal characteristics have on the
respondents' likelihoods of being harassed, the same variables
controlled for in Equation 1 are controlled for in these regressions. For
the results of the regressions to fully support Shultz's theory, the
independent variables More Men and All Men must have a positive
and significant coefficient in the female sample and All Women and
More Women must have a positive and significant coefficient in the
male sample. This would show that employees at poorly integrated
workplaces are more likely to experience sexual harassment.
I use a similar empirical specification to determine if the
degree of sex integration has an effect on the respondent's perceptions
of sexual harassment:
(3) Pr (Perceptions =1) = <D [B + B'Integration + 82'PC + 83'WC + e]
Similar to the specification used to analyze the reasonable woman
standard, the dependent variable Perceptions is a dichotomous
variable for whether the respondent believes a certain action is
harassment.176 Again, the sample is split into men and women,
personal characteristics (PC) and workplace characteristics (WC) are
controlled for, and the independent variables of interest are
dichotomous variables for degrees of workplace integration
(Integration). If these integration variables have significant effects on
the respondent's perceptions that are in line with the segregation
theory, then the results support Schultz's theory that employees view
harassment differently based on the degree of integration in the
workplace.
2. Results
Table 3 reports the results showing how the composition of the
workplace and the sex of the respondent's supervisor affect the
176. Note that this variable was created by coding the responses "probably yes" and
"definitely yes" both as 1 to represent believing the action is harassment and "probably not" and
"definitely not" as 0 ("don't know" and missing responses are dropped as missing variables).
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likelihood that the respondent experienced sexual harassment in the
previous two years. As the results show, women are statistically
significantly more likely to experience harassment in a workplace that
has more men. A woman working in a workplace with more men is
approximately 8.7 percentage points more likely to have experienced
harassment in the previous two years than a woman working in an
environment with an equal amount of men and women, and a woman
working in a workplace with all men is approximately 15.5 percentage
points more likely to report having this experience. Because none of
the male integration coefficients are statistically significant, the
results do not show that men are more likely to experience
harassment when they work in a female-dominated workplace.' 77
These results are partially consistent with Shultz's theory
because harassment of women is indeed more likely in a workplace
where women have not been successfully integrated. Thus, the results
support the idea that it should be easier for a female plaintiff to prove
sexual harassment in a workplace that has not achieved integration of
the sexes. However, the results do not show that a woman is less
likely to experience harassment in a well-integrated workplace,
because the coefficients on More Female and on All Female Employees
are not statistically significant. Because of the lack of consistently
significant results for each theory, I do not believe that these statistics
support altering the burden of proof in order to make it harder for a
plaintiff to prove sexual harassment when complaining in well-
integrated workplaces, but I believe that they do support introducing
the integration of the workplace as a factor in the totality-of-the-
circumstances standard.
177. Note that these results are different than those reported by Jackson and Newman, who
find statistically significant results for female workplaces in a male regression, because they
control for demographic variables in a different manner, do not seem to include a weighting
variable, and do not seem to report robust standard errors. Jackson & Newman, supra note 97,
at 710-12.
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Table 3
Coefficients on the Independent Integration Variables for the
Dependent Variable Experience
Variable Male Female
Female Supervisor 0.041 Omitted(0.033)
Male Supervisor omitted -0.016
(0.029)
All Male -0.034 0.155**
(0.057) (0.069)
More Male 0.005 0.087***
(0.034) (0.033)
More Female 0.049 0.013
(0.036) (0.032)
All Female 0.122 -0.079
(0.192) (0.138)
Observations 2,973 3,576
Data Source: U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 1994 Sexual Harassment Survey.
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and the regressions include multiple
control variables and a constant term. **, *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. Reference categories are Female Supervisor and Equal Male/Female for the
female regression and Male Supervisor and Equal Male/Female for the Male regression. All
values are weighted by the provided MSPB weight. See Table 1A of the Appendix for all
controls and for all reference categories.
Tables 4 and 5 provide the results for the regressions that
follow Equation 3, where the dependent variables are the perception
variables for male and female respondents respectively. Though some
of the resulting coefficients are statistically significant, these results
are extremely varied and do not provide a definite pattern that would
support Shultz's theory. Shultz states not only that harassment is
more likely in poorly integrated workplaces, but that certain
unwelcome behaviors are also more likely to be perceived as
harassment in those environments.178 The directions of the coefficients
on both well-integrated and poorly integrated workplaces do not follow
a specific pattern, which shows that perceptions were not affected by
the integration of the workplace in a systematic way. However, some
of the results are statistically significant and would support Shultz's
theory. For almost every perceived behavior, men in an all-female
environment are more likely than men in an equal-male-and-female
178. Schultz, supra note 12, at 2174.
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environment to believe it constitutes harassment. In addition, women
respondents are more likely to report that touching from a supervisor
or coworker (CW Touch and Sup Touch) and pressure for dates from a
supervisor (Sup Dates) are harassment when working in an all-male
environment.
In addition, having a male supervisor does significantly affect a
female respondent's likelihood of reporting that certain behaviors
constitute harassment in certain circumstances. Female respondents
with a male supervisor (Male Supervisor) are 4.9 percentage points
more likely to report that teasing from a coworker (CW Teasing) is
harassment, 2.4 percentage points more likely to report that pressure
for dates from a supervisor (Sup Dates) is harassment, and 3.7
percentage points more likely to report that pressure for dates from a
coworker (CW Dates) is harassment. This result is consistent with
Shultz's proposal that vertical sex integration should be taken into
account when determining harassment.179 Because being in a
workplace with a male supervisor makes a female more likely to view
an action as harassment, Shultz proposes that sexual harassment
should be easier to prove for a female plaintiff working in those
environments.180
Ultimately, these results provide varied insights into how the
integration of sexes in a workplace affects the likelihood of employees
experiencing workplace sexual harassment or perceiving a behavior as
sexual harassment. This empirical analysis does not provide strong
insight into perceptions of sexual harassment. However, the results do
provide some support for Shultz's proposal. Because Shultz focuses on
the male-dominated workplace and is concerned with the continuing
prevalence of sex discrimination against females, the fact that the
results for male respondents are weak does not necessarily negate her
arguments. 181 Instead, the fact that women were more likely to
experience harassment in male-dominated workplaces and, in some
circumstances, were more likely to view a behavior as harassment if
they worked in male-dominated workplaces supports Shultz's call for
lowering the plaintiffs burden when the harassment occurred in that
type of environment.182 However, the fact that respondents were not
less likely to experience harassment in integrated workplaces counsels
against Shultz's suggestion that harassment should be more difficult
179. Id. at 2178-79.
180. Id.
181. See id at 2180 (discussing male/female ratios for the parameters for each of the
suggestions).
182. Supra Table 3; infra Table 5; see Shultz, supra note 12, at 2175 (suggesting lowered
burdens on plaintiffs in poorly integrated workplaces).
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to prove in those situations. 83 Because it is important to encourage
employers to integrate their workplaces and for courts to recognize the
prevalence of harassment in poorly integrated environments, I draw
the conclusion that the level of sex integration should be considered
when determining what behaviors constitute harassment; however,
because the results do not strongly show that working in a poorly
integrated environment causes respondents to perceive behaviors as
harassment, courts should not go so far as to use the degree of
integration in the plaintiffs workplace as a basis for a changing the
burden that the plaintiff bears.
Table 4. Coefficients on the Independent Integration Variables from
Each Male Perception Regression
Variable Sup CW Sup CW Sup CW
Favors Favors Looks Looks Teasing Teasing
Female 0.005 0.001 0.017 0.006 0.049* -0.002
Supervisor (0.007) (0.009) (0.030) (0.034) (0.028) (0.039)
All Male -0.029 -0.014 0.014 -0.013 0.018 0.040
(0.032) (0.031) (0.051) (0.062) (0.061) (0.070)
More Male 0.021 0.023 0.011 0.024 0.079** 0.080*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041)
More Female 0.020 0.020 -0.005 -0.033 0.058 0.014
(0.012) (0.014) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041)
All Female 0.029** 0.036** 0.097** 0.174*** 0.197*** 0.305***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.044) (0.060) (0.063) (0.073)
Observations 2,902 2,753 2,563 2,465 2,539 2,452
183. See Shultz, supra note 12, at 2176 (suggesting more stringent burdens on plaintiffs in
well-integrated workplaces).
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
Table 4 Continued
Variable Sup CW Sup CW Sup CW
Dates Dates Touch Touch Calls Calls
Female 0.017 0.004 0.013 0.002 -0.007 0.000
Supervisor (0.025) (0.028) (0.012) (0.016) (0.024) (0.029)
All Male -0.042 -0.119** -0.021 -0.035 -0.009 -0.005
(0.055) (0.058) (0.039) (0.043) (0.044) (0.053)
More Male 0.019 0.004 0.036* 0.043** 0.023 0.074**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.032)
More Female 0.001 -0.053* 0.034** 0.024 0.025 0.036
(0.031) (0.031) (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.030)
All Female 0.066* 0.019 0.041** 0.056** 0.101*** 0.152***
(0.040) (0.111) (0.018) (0.023) (0.032) (0.042)
Observations 2,029 2,568 2,823 2,711 2,766 2,634
Data Source: U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 1994 Sexual Harassment Survey.
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and each regression includes multiple
control variables and a constant term. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. All values are weighted by the provided MSPB weight. See Appendix
Table 1A for full controls and reference categories.
Table 5. Coefficients on the Independent Integration Variables from
Each Female Perception Regression
Sup CW Sup CW Sup CW
Favors Favors Looks Looks Teasing Teasing
Male -0.006 -0.004 0.008 0.010 0.028 0.049**
Supervisor (0.006) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021)
All Male
More Male
0.008 0.005 0.012
(0.008) (0.004) (0.030)
0.005 0.001 0.020
(0.007) (0.006) (0.014)
More Female 0.006 0.006 0.019
(0.007) (0.004) (0.015)
All Female -0.074 -0.081 -0.030
(0.050) (0.051) (0.055)
Observations 3,536 3,466 3,357
0.020 -0.010 0.008
(0.031) (0.045) (0.048)
0.017 0.033* 0.039*
(0.014) (0.020) (0.024)
0.026* 0.025 0.042*
(0.015) (0.020) (0.023)
-0.024
(0.058)
3,245
-0.004
(0.064)
3,237
0.030
(0.085)
3,117
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Table 5 Continued
Variable Sup CW Sup CW Sup CW
Dates Dates Touch Touch Calls Calls
Male 0.024* 0.037** -0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.004
Supervisor (0.015) (0.017) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013)
All Male 0.002 0.028 0.014* 0.020*** 0.039*** 0.067***
(0.042) (0.036) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015)
More Male 0.029* 0.019 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.027*
(0.016) (0.020) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.016)
More Female 0.024 0.024 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.032**
(0.017) (0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014)
All Female -0.037 0.004 -0.068 -0.073 -0.065 -0.046
(0.060) (0.058) (0.049) (0.051) (0.054) (0.055)
Observations 2,835 3,264 3,515 3,448 3,468 3,355
Data Source: U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 1994 Sexual Harassment Survey.
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and the each regression includes multiple
control variables and a constant term. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. All values are weighted by the provided MSPB weight. See Appendix
Table lA for full controls and reference categories.
VI. HOW TO CLEAR THE WAY: SOLUTION AND INTEGRATION OF
STANDARDS
Current sexual harassment law is vague and unclear. Because
the instrumental phrase "severe or pervasive" is subjective, whether
or not a behavior creates a hostile work environment depends on the
perceptions of the person experiencing the behavior. Additional legal
standards must be implemented in order to advance Title VII's goal of
ridding the workplace of discrimination. The Supreme Court should
resolve the circuit split over the reasonable woman standard and
recognize that there is a difference between the conduct that men and
women perceive as sexual harassment.184 The empirical results found
in Part III.D of this Note illustrate these differing perceptions and
support the adoption of the reasonable woman standard. 185
184. This difference in perceptions is proven in the results supra Part III.D.3.
185. See supra Part IllI.D.
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The Court should also clarify that the circumstances
considered as indicative of a hostile work environment in Harris and
Oncale were not all inclusive. 86 Instead the Court should encourage
courts to consider additional factors, such as the supervisor status of
the harasser and the level of sex integration in the workplace. The
empirical results developed in Part IV.C show that employees are
more likely to perceive supervisor behaviors as actionable harassment
than coworker behaviors, which supports using the status of the
harasser as a factor to establish severity.187 Though the empirical
results of Part V.B do not show that working in a poorly integrated
workplace always leads to perceiving more actions as harassment, the
results do show that these environments lead to more instances of
harassment and occasionally affect an employee's perceptions of
harassment.188 These results may not be strong enough to suggest that
the Court should lower the burden of proving severity for a plaintiff in
a poorly integrated workplace, as Schultz suggests, but they do
support the consideration of the level of sex integration as a factor
when determining what constitutes harassment.189 If courts ignore
empirical evidence establishing that different characteristics of the
harassment, different characteristics of the workplace, and different
characteristics of the plaintiff alter the employee's perceptions of
sexual harassment, courts will likely disincentivize employers from
advancing Title VII's goals.
The EEOC and the Supreme Court have recognized that "Title
VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."190 Although Shultz
has a point when she argues that sexual harassment law should not
overdeter or focus on preventing harmless sexual conduct,191 the law
exists primarily to protect the minority sex of the workplace from
discriminatory actions that interrupt the employee's work
environment.192 In order to properly deter employers from allowing the
type of sex discrimination that interrupts the employee, the law must
more precisely reflect the employee's perception of what actions
constitute sexual harassment.
186. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998); Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
187. See supra Part IV.C.
188. See supra Part V.C.
189. See Shultz, supra note 12, at 2175 (proposing a change in the burden of proving sexual
harassment based on the level of sex integration in the workplace).
190. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
191. Schultz, supra note 12, at 2174.
192. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
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Of course, it will be difficult for the Supreme Court to define
hostile work environment sexual harassment more precisely, because
the perceptions of it are so varied. However, the Court can account for
the employees' differing perceptions by considering particular factors
in the totality-of-the-circumstances test developed in Harris and
Oncale.193 If the Court recognizes these differing perceptions, then
more behaviors that actually disrupt the workplace will be deterred.
Though adding standards may seem like it will only complicate
sexual harassment law, they are needed to address behavior that is
currently overlooked. In 2005, the Sixth Circuit upheld the Western
District of Kentucky's determination that a supervisor's behavior did
not satisfy the severe-or-pervasive standard of hostile work
environment. 194 However, if the Sixth Circuit had applied the three
standards discussed in this Note, the court would have likely found
differently.
The plaintiff, Rhonda Knoop, was an employee of the United
Parcel Service ("UPS"), a corporation that has a history of defending
sex discrimination claims and is generally known to be a male-
dominated workplace. 95 Knoop alleged that her male supervisor told
sexual jokes in front of her and other employees and that he once
pulled on her overalls in order to look down them after asking what
was underneath them.196 Additionally, Knoop recounted that the
supervisor twice placed his vibrating pager on her upper thigh and
asked her if it "felt good."197 Comparing this case to other cases where
the court did not find a hostile work environment and emphasizing
that the behaviors occurred over two years, the court upheld the
summary judgment motion for UPS.198 The Sixth Circuit held that
"[a]lthough Knoop's allegations of harassment by Brock [the harasser]
193. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998); Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
194. Clark v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 400 F.3d 341, 351-52 (6th Cir. 2005). Note that the
Sixth Circuit also upheld the district court's denial of summary judgment for Sandra Clark,
holding that she presented "more of an ongoing pattern of unwanted conduct and attention" from
the supervisor. Id at 352.
195. On the UPS website describing a women's leadership program, a female employee is
quoted describing the challenges of working in a male-dominated industry. Leadership
Development, UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., http://www.community.ups.com/Diversity/
Programs/Ieadership+Development (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). A Westlaw search for sex
discrimination cases against UPS returns almost twenty cases.
196. Clark, 400 F.3d at 345.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 352.
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could certainly be construed as offensive, they are simply not
substantial enough to satisfy the prima facie showing."199
Had the Sixth Circuit applied the theories analyzed in this
Note, Knoop's claim of sexual harassment might have survived
summary judgment. If the court had applied a reasonable woman
standard, then the court would have granted summary judgment only
if a reasonable woman could not have perceived the supervisor's
actions as severe or pervasive. 200 Had the court taken into account the
fact that the behavior was performed by Knoop's supervisor and that
UPS was a male-dominated workplace, the court may have come to a
conclusion that fairly reflected the power differential and the
consequences of supervisor behavior, and its result could have
deterred poorly integrated workplaces from allowing any form of sex
discrimination. 201 If each of these theories had been adopted, then the
severity of the harassment would have been greatly elevated and
Knoop would have likely established a "closer case" that her
supervisor's actions were severe and interfered with her workplace. 202
Instead, Knoop did not receive her day in court, and the court missed
an opportunity to incentivize employers to take proactive steps toward
eliminating sexual discrimination and harassment in male-dominated
workplaces.
The above-mentioned case is only one of many that might have
had a different outcome if the three theories empirically supported in
this Note had been applied. It highlights a situation where a woman
who was uncomfortable in her male-dominated workplace was not
provided a full trial on the merits because of the vague state of sexual
harassment law. The employer was not punished and, thus, was not
properly encouraged to establish preventative procedures. Courts can
and should take steps to clarify sexual harassment law, starting by
introducing the theories empirically supported in this Note; if they do
not, sexual harassment will continue to be a major problem in the
workplace and a major contributor to workplace sex discrimination.
199. Id.
200. See supra Part III (discussing the reasonable woman theory and providing an empirical
analysis that supports this theory).
201. See supra Part IV (discussing the theory of the supervisor status of the harasser being
a part of the severe-or-pervasive test and providing empirical support for this theory).
202. The court determined the other plaintiffs case to be a "closer case" and denied
summary judgment. Clark, 400 F.3d at 352.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, each court must take a case-by-case look to
determine whether a behavior is severe or pervasive and constitutes
actionable sexual harassment. Because perceptions are such an
important part of determining the definition of these terms and the
reasonableness of a sexual harassment case, the empirical evidence
developed in this Note is persuasive support for the integration of the
reasonable woman standard into sexual harassment law. This Note's
empirical evidence also supports considering the supervisor status of
the harasser and the degree of sex integration when deciding what
constitutes harassment. The application of these theories can improve
courts' ability to determine which actions constitute hostile work
environment harassment. Having empirical support for the
introduction of these theories can only strengthen the argument for
application. Without the integration of clearer standards into sexual
harassment law, courts will likely continue to overlook certain forms
of sexual harassment, and employers will not be properly incentivized
to develop workplaces free of sex discrimination.
V Blair Druhan*
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APPENDIX
Table 1A. Summary Statistics: The1994 MSPB Survey
Variables
Perceptions Female Male
0.939 0.811Coworker Looks
Female (n=3,857) Male (n= 2,934)
Supervisor Looks
Female (n= 3,989) Male (n=3,051)
Coworker Calls
Female (n=3989) Male (n= 3134)
Supervisor Calls
Female (n=4,121) Male (n=3,295)
Coworker Touching
Female(n=4,095) Male(n=3,234)
Supervisor Touching
Female (n=4,180) Male(n=3,363)
Coworker Favors
Female(n=4,119) Male (n= 3,282)
Supervisor Favors
Female(n=4,208) Male (n=3,468)
Coworker Dates
Female(n= 3,871) Male (n=3,063)
Supervisor Dates
Female(n= 3,381) Male(n= 2,420)
Coworker Teasing
Female(n=3,705) Male (n=2,930)
Supervisor Teasing
Female(n=3,862) Male (n=3,037)
Harassed
Respondent Was Harassed
Education
High School or Less
Technical School
Some College
College Degree
Some Grad School
Grad Degree
Marital Status
Single
Divorced / Widowed
Married
Female (n=4,259)
0.480
Female (n= 3,733)
0.134
0.157
0.362
0.186
0.058
0.087
Female (n= 3,884)
0.209
0.234
0.556
0.865
0.883
0.924
0.941
0.961
0.979
0.981
0.856
0.900
0.749
0.827
Male (n=3,560)
0.246
Male (n=3,067)
0.056
0.146
0.277
0.221
0.111
0.179
Male (n= 3,203)
0.129
0.115
0.755
0.949
0.955
0.971
0.985
0.989
0.994
0.992
0.906
0.943
0.859
0.903
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Age
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
Over 55
Pay Grade
Pay Grades 1-4
Pay Grades 5-10
Pay Grades 11-12
Pay Grades 13-15
Pay Grade Higher than 15
OccuDation
Trainee
Blue Collar
Clerical
Professional
Management
Other Job
Table 1A Continued
Female (n=3,961)
0.029
0.207
0.349
0.311
0.104
Female (n= 3,521)
0.081
0.619
0.216
0.083
0.001
Female (n= 3,878)
0.009
0.045
0.475
0.223
0.222
0.026
Supervisor 0.149 0.297
Female (n=3,880) Male(n=3,206)
Workplace Characteristics Female (n= 3,895) Male (n= 3,214)
Male Supervisor 0.628 0.855
Female Supervisor 0.323 0.256
All Male Employees 0.039 0.074
More Male Employees 0.306 0.536
Equal Male/Female 0.289 0.243
More Female Employees 0.357 0.479
All Female Employees 0.008 0.004
Data Source: U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 1994 Sexual Harassment Survey.
Notes: Weighted means are reported, with their standard errors in parentheses. Each of the
personal demographic variables described in Table 1A are included in each of the regressions
found in Parts III and V of this Note, with the exception of an omitted variable for each
category of demographics. The omitted categories in each regression are: High School or
Less, Married, 16-24, Pay Grade Higher than 15, Other Job, Male Supervisor (for pooled and
male regressions), Female Supervisor (for female regressions), and Equal Male/Female. Full
regression results are on file with the author and the Vanderbilt Law Review. Each
regression includes a constant term, and all values are weighted by the provided MSPB
weight.
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Male (n= 3,278)
0.007
0.155
0.323
0.365
0.149
Male (n= 4,213)
0.036
0.398
0.325
0.234
0.007
Male (n= 3,200)
0.009
0.201
0.169
0.345
0.239
0.037
&
